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AT THE INTERSECTION OF INSURANCE
AND TAX: EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
JULIE A. LEWIS 1
INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act creates a
social contract between individuals and their health plans. The
Act guarantees minimum health care services at a cost that is
affordable to most of us. It also embraces insurance as the means
to pay health care providers and spread the cost of their services
over the widest possible set of participants. This paper examines
the role of health insurance in ensuring the social safety net.
Recently, courts have recognized insurers, employers and
others who administer health insurance as benefits trustees with
fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA akin to the trustees of
pension and retirement plans. Plan participants, in the role of
beneficiaries, have gained new rights to equitable relief intended
to preserve their health care services and compensate for any loss.
ERISA section 1132(a)(3) equitable relief now includes a
judicially recognized right to monetary damages—restitution,
surcharge, unjust enrichment and disgorgement of profits—in
response to a health plan’s breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
These recently articulated rights will be the critical avenue to
remedial action under the Affordable Care Act.
This paper examines the Seventh Circuit’s recent line of cases
addressing breach of a health plan’s fiduciary duty to individual
plan participants beginning with Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan,
Inc. Part I reviews the court’s 2009 Kenseth decision (Kenseth I)
which sets out the parameters of a fiduciary breach. Part II looks
how the court, post-Amara, addresses equitable remedies in its
2013 Kenseth decision (Kenseth II), including the Supreme Court’s
evolution on the topic.
While Dean Health Plan is the named defendant in the
Kenseth case, the situation to which Dean was responding is now
universal. The fact pattern of the Kenseth case will be replicated
until insurers, employers and other fiduciaries develop a system of
providing health insurance coverage that meets the heightened
statutory and judicial requirements for participant protection.

1. Julie A. Lewis is a member of the Nowlan & Mouat LLP law firm in
Janesville, Wisconsin. She represents corporate and government clients in the
areas of labor and employment, employee benefits and commercial law.
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I.

DEBORAH KENSETH’S SURGERY

In 1987, Deborah Kenseth had a vertical banded gastroplasty
to help her lose weight. 2 The group health plan she had at the time
covered the procedure. In time, an obstruction developed, causing
severe acid reflux, and by 2004, she was regularly experiencing
painful symptoms related to gastric stenosis. She consulted a
bariatric surgeon at Dean Health Systems in 2005, who
recommended a surgical procedure known as Roux-en-Y to bypass
the obstruction. His notes reference the 1987 gastroplasty, but
indicate that the Roux-en-Y procedure would be revision surgery
and not bariatric, as Kenseth did not need weight loss surgery.
Kenseth’s group health insurer was the Dean Health Plan
(“Dean”). The 2005 Dean Health Plan Certificate excluded surgical
treatment for morbid obesity as a non-covered service. In addition,
“services and/or supplies related to a non-covered benefit or
service” were listed under “General Exclusions and Limitations.”
According to the Certificate, Dean was the claims administrator
with “the [final and binding] discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits.”
Kenseth’s surgery was scheduled for December 6, 2005. The
surgery instruction form directed patients to “check on” prior
authorization, pre-certification requirements and insurance
coverage and to inform their insurance company of “the date and
type of surgery” scheduled.
Kenseth called Dean’s customer service number on November
9, 2005. She informed the representative that she was scheduled
2. See Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 610 F.3d 452, 456 (2010)
(Kenseth I) (detailing Kenseth’s surgery).
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for a Roux-en-Y esophageal reconstruction procedure to address
severe acid reflux. She did not mention the 1987 gastroplasty. The
customer service representative told her the procedure would be
covered with a $300 co-pay. Kenseth relied on this advice and
proceeded with surgery on December 6, 2005.
By written notice dated December 8, 2005, Dean denied
coverage for the surgery and all services “related to” the
gastroplasty, a non-covered benefit. Coincidentally perhaps, the
general exclusions section in Dean’s 2006 certificate was revised to
read, “Services and supplies for, or in connection with, a noncovered procedure or service, including complications . . . .” In the
meantime, Kenseth suffered complications from the Roux-en-Y
surgery, and was readmitted to the hospital for two weeks in
January 2006. The final cost of the surgery and two
hospitalizations was $77,974. Kenseth exhausted her internal
review rights and then filed suit under ERISA section 1132(a)(3). 34
As the court saw it, Kenseth alleged that Dean breached its
fiduciary duty to her because 1) the Certificate was unclear
regarding coverage of her 2005 surgery and misleading as to the
process she should follow to determine coverage, and 2) Dean
failed to provide her with a procedure by which she could obtain
an authoritative preapproval of her surgery. 5 Kenseth also argued
that Dean was collaterally estopped from denying coverage under
these circumstances because Dean’s representative advised her
that the procedure would be covered and she relied on that
advice. 6

3. Kenseth also sued under Wis. Stat. § 632.746(1)(b), which limits preexisting condition exclusions to 12 months. Id. at 463-64. The court upheld
summary judgment for Dean on this claim. Id.
4. Under section 1132(a)(3), a civil action may be brought:
By a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates … the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to address such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of … the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
5. Kenseth I at 461.
6. The district court dismissed Kenseth’s collateral estoppel claim for two
reasons. See id. at 462 (detailing the district court’s decision). In light of
Kenseth’s failure to disclose that the surgery was intended to remediate a
complication from her gastroplasty, Dean’s advice was arguably accurate. In
addition, Dean’s oral representations could not amend coverage terms, like the
general exclusion for weight loss surgery and related services that were
unambiguously set out in the certificate. The Seventh Circuit upheld summary
judgment on this claim as well. See id. at 463 (holding that “given that Dean
did not know a fact that was highly material to coverage under its policy, we
do not think that it can be equitably estopped on the basis of an oral
representation that its agent made on the basis of limited and incomplete
facts”).
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A. District Court
The federal district court for the Western District of
Wisconsin granted summary judgment to Dean on each claim. The
court did not find a duty for group health plans to provide an
authoritative pre-approval process under section 1132(a)(3). 7 As
long as the certificate could reasonably be understood by the
average person, the insurer-fiduciary is not obligated to explain it.
Kenseth admitted that she did not read the certificate before
proceeding with surgery. To the district court, the exclusion was
clear (or clear enough) to put her on notice that the Roux-en-Y
procedure would be excluded because it was related to a noncovered service.

B. Court of Appeals
On the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the appellate court
held that a factfinder could conclude that Dean breached its duty
of loyalty based on the following facts: 1) Dean provided Kenseth
with “plan documentation that was unclear as to coverage for her
surgery,” 2) Dean invited plan participants to call customer service
to obtain coverage information but failed “to warn callers that they
cannot rely on the answers they are given”, and 3) Dean failed “to
inform participants how they might obtain answers from Dean
they could rely on.” 8
The court then evaluated the claim’s legal merits using the
ERISA rubric. “A claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) that the defendant is a plan
fiduciary; (2) that the defendant breached its fiduciary duty; and
(3) that the breach resulted in harm to the plaintiff.” 9 And,
introducing the most complex element of its analysis, the court
noted that section 1132(a)(3) limits a plan participant’s remedy to
equitable relief if she is suing on her own instead of on behalf of
the participant class. 10

II. KENSETH I—A GROUP HEALTH PLAN’S FIDUCIARY
BREACH
A. Dean Health Plan’s Status as a Plan Fiduciary
The customer service representative on whose advice Kenseth
7. Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (W.D.
Wis. 2008).
8. Kenseth I at 464.
9. Id. (citing Kannapien v. Quaker Oats Co., 507 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir.
2007).
10. Id. at 464.
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relied was a ministerial employee with no discretionary authority
over the plan terms. Dean was not, therefore, subject to a
respondeat superior claim. 11 Dean was, however, a fiduciary in its
own right as the claims administrator with discretionary authority
to construe and apply the plan’s terms and determine participants’
entitlement to benefits. 12 The court squares up Dean’s duty with
that of a trustee at common law. This longstanding fiduciary/
trustee identification enables the Kenseth court (and other courts
that have ruled on these questions) to expand the equitable relief
available to plaintiffs under section 1132(a)(3).

B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The court’s analysis hones in on the trustee’s duty to disclose
material information. 13 Breach of this duty can be one of
commission—the duty not to mislead or misrepresent the plan
terms—and one of omission—the affirmative obligation to disclose
material facts when the participant requests information and
“‘even when he or she does not.’” 14
The court relies on Anweiler v. American Electric Power
Service Corp., 15 a crossover 1993 decision involving a life
insurance policy, as precedent for the premise that an insurer has
11. This issue has been developed on a separate but parallel track to the
evolving ERISA group health plan case law. The extent to which a plan
fiduciary is responsible for communications made by its administrative
employees is an open issue. Current decisions, including Kenseth, hold that
plans will not be liable when the plan document is clear and an otherwise
properly trained administrator makes an inadvertent mistake. However, a
plan fiduciary can be liable for misrepresentation under ERISA when it fails
to properly train the ministerial employees who are tasked with
communicating and interpreting an unclear or ambiguous plan document to
participants. Kenseth I at 470-71. This posture certainly raises the possibility
of an extension of the “cat’s paw” theory to fiduciary breach claims.
12. The court cites to section 1104(a)(1) for the controlling definition of the
plan’s fiduciary duties:
Dean is obliged to carry out its duties with respect to the plan “solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and – (A) for the
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries; . . . [and] (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. . . .”
Kenseth I at 465 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
13. The court relies on the Restatement of Trusts by noting that the
trustee “is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does
not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in dealing
with a third person.” Id. at 466 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 173 cmt. d (1959)).
14. Id. at 466 (quoting Anweiler v. American Electric Power Service
Corporation, 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993)).
15. 3 F.3d 986.
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a trustee’s obligation to fully inform plan beneficiaries of all
material facts. The plaintiff in the Anweiler case was a widow
whose husband unwittingly agreed to make the insurer a
beneficiary of his life insurance policy. 16 Because Aetna, the
insurer and putative beneficiary, did not inform Mr. Anweiler that
this choice was optional, the court held that Aetna breached its
fiduciary duty to the insured. 17
In the Seventh Circuit, breach of a group health plan’s duty to
provide material information had already been recognized in the
group health plan context in Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 18
An employee who declined COBRA coverage during a one month
leave from work found herself without group health insurance
coverage for her pregnancy after she returned to work. 19 The
Bowerman court found that the plan documents were unclear
about the break in service rules. 20 In addition, an administrative
assistant in the benefits department told the employee that her
coverage would be resumed when she returned to work. 21 The
court deemed Wal-Mart’s actions to be a breach of its duty to
disclose material information. 22
The Kenseth decision sets out some limits. First, the court
declines to create a fiduciary obligation to provide a binding
coverage opinion on every preauthorization request. 23 Second,
there is a line, the court holds, between the duty to disclose
material
facts
and
fiduciary
liability
for
negligent
misrepresentation, particularly for comments made by ministerial
employees. Examination of the trustee’s state of mind to determine
a degree of scienter is not consistent with trust law. In addition,
since no plan document can address every fact permutation,
communication errors will be made. Strict liability is not
appropriate when the fiduciary’s duty requires the exercise of
reasonable care. 24
Instead, fiduciaries are bound by section 1104(a)(1)(b) to take
16. Id. at 988.
17. Id. at 991.
18. 226 F.3d 574, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2000).
19. Id. at 580.
20. Id. at 589.
21. Id. at 580.
22. Id. at 591.
23. Kenseth I at 472 (recognizing, however, that two courts have concluded
that a health insurer has a good faith duty to advise the insured in advance of
treatment whether the treatment is medically necessary and, as such, covered
by the plan); cf. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Gueimunde, 823 So.
2d 141, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the insurer “does not have
the obligation to preauthorize surgery in a situation in which the injury is
within the coverage of the medical payments portion of the insurance policy);
Eggiman v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 134 Ore. App. 377, 847 P.2d 333, 335-37
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the good faith duty of insurer to advise insured of
coverage in advance).
24. Kenseth I at 470.
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reasonable steps to ensure that the insured receives accurate and
complete information about his or her insurance coverage. Here,
the Kenseth court pauses to distinguish Frahm v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of U.S. 25 In Frahm, the court declined to create
a cause of action for fiduciary negligence when a plan agent gives
incorrect information to a participant as long as the plan
documents are clear and the fiduciary has implemented
reasonable safeguards to avoid error. 26 In Kenseth, the caveat
becomes the rule. Although Kenseth relied to her detriment on
ultimately erroneous advice from Dean’s representative, Dean’s
breach was not in the advice given but in its incomplete certificate
and its failure properly to train its representatives to respond
correctly to participant questions.
The fiduciary duty, therefore, has two components in the
group health insurance context. One, “[t]he most important way in
which the fiduciary complies with its duty of care is to provide
accurate and complete written explanations of the benefits
available to plan participants and beneficiaries.” 27 Two, because
no plan document can answer every question, mistakes by plan
agents will not end in breach if the agents are properly hired,
trained and supervised. When plan documents are silent or
ambiguous on recurring topics, properly trained personnel become
that much more important. The plan, as fiduciary, has an
affirmative duty to disclose all material information, whether
requested or not. 28
Although Dean’s certificate of coverage excluded charges
relating to a non-covered service, the court finds this language
ambiguous regarding treatment “related to” a procedure completed
18 years earlier. 29 Dean instructs participants to call its customer
service line for both preauthorization and eligibility questions. But
the certificate does not warn participants that preauthorization is
not binding and they cannot rely on the customer service
representatives’ advice. And consistent with its discussion of the
positive and negative aspects of the duty to provide all material
information, the court builds on the failure to warn by holding
that, if Dean chose not to construe its plan with finality, it was
obliged to instruct participants on how they “might otherwise
obtain a definitive decision, in advance of [their] surgery, as to
25. 137 F.3d 955, 958-60 (7th Cir. 1998).
26. See also, Brooks v. Pactiv Corp., 729 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) (an
employer who is also a benefits plan administrator wears two hats such that
termination of employment is not a fiduciary act even though that decision can
affect a participant’s benefits eligibility).
27. Kenseth I at 471.
28. Id. at 466.
29. The court notes that the gastroplasty was covered by Kenseth’s insurer
at the time. In addition, in 2004, Dean covered an endoscopic procedure
Kenseth had to relieve stenosis which was identified in the medical record as a
complication of the gastroplasty. Id. at 475.
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whether Dean would cover it.” 30 31 In a word, Dean’s role as a
fiduciary obligated it to act at all times in Kenseth’s best interest.
The court recognizes a duty of care for health plan fiduciaries
that requires them to offer a binding, authoritative declaration of
coverage either in writing or on request, regardless of the plan’s
reservation of rights. This expansion is critical in the health plan
setting. If a health plan participant can demonstrate that the plan
breached its fiduciary duty of care to the individual participant
and caused her harm by providing inadequate coverage advice, the
participant may seek an appropriate equitable remedy.

C. Harm
The court briefly touches on facts supporting the claim that
Kenseth was harmed by Dean’s fiduciary breach. Because she
offered evidence that there were alternatives not taken, including
finding other coverage and continuing with ameliorative treatment
in lieu of Roux-en-Y surgery, the court concludes that a factfinder
could find harm.

D. Remedy
At this point, the court turns to the key question of remedy.
Does ERISA offer Kenseth a remedy? Without one, she has no
claim. 32 The court acknowledges that Dean’s breach will not
support an award of equitable restitution because she did not, and
could not, file a section 1132(a)(1)(b) denial of benefits claim. 33
Navigating in a perfect factual storm, the court remands the case
to the district court to determine whether Kenseth’s requested
30. Id. at 481. Dean’s certificate, of course, contained a standard
disclaimer:
No oral statement of any person shall modify or otherwise effect [sic] the
benefits, limitations, exclusions, and conditions of this contract; convey
or void any coverage; increase or reduce benefits described within this
Policy; or be used in the prosecution or defense of a claim under this
Plan.
The court dismissed this term as useful only to lawyers. Id. at 479.
31. In Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2013)
(Kenseth II), the court refines this holding, stating that, by inviting
participants to call customer service with preauthorization and eligibility
questions, Dean created its own obligation to either provide a definitive
coverage determination or instruct participants on how to obtain one. Id. at
873. Furthermore, if the certificate had clearly excluded coverage for
complications arising from a procedure 18 years prior, there would be no need
for a subsequent coverage determination. Id.
32. There is no right without a remedy. “[T]he main strength and force of a
law consists in the penalty annexed to it.” 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 57.
33. Dean’s reservation of discretion to construe the plan would necessitate
an arbitrary and capricious review. Kenseth I at 483.
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remedy of compensatory damages is legal in nature and, therefore,
beyond the scope of section 1132(a)(3) equitable remedies.
The district court finds that ERISA does not authorize the
monetary damages Kenseth requests and dismisses the case. In
the meantime, the Supreme Court issues its decision in Cigna
Corp. v. Amara. 34

III. KENSETH II—EQUITABLE THEORIES AND REMEDIES
UNDER SECTION 1132(A)(3)
The Amara decision famously recognizes a money payment as
traditional equitable relief. 35 Courts may award monetary
compensation for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of duty or
even to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment. The fact that a
group health plan fiduciary is analogous to a trustee means that a
compensatory award or surcharge, in addition to the traditional
remedies of reformation, estoppel, mandamus, injunctions and
restitution, is available to individual plan participants under
section 1132(a)(3). The plaintiff must be able to show causation
and actual harm but does not have to prove detrimental reliance. 36

A. The Availability of Make-Whole Monetary Relief
In Kenseth II, the court observes the now fast-tracked
transposition from life insurance decisions to group health
insurance. 37 Previously, courts found a right to money damages
under section 1132(a)(3) for plan administrator error causing loss
of retirement medical coverage 38 and premium overpayment when
the insurer mistakenly accepts life insurance premiums after
coverage termination and then denies benefits. 39
The same conclusions should apply to group health insurance.
The Kenseth court makes the point when evaluating the harm
caused by the plan’s actions. The health insurance participant:
[takes] an irreversible course of action in reliance on the approval
given [by the health plan’s] customer service representative, a
reliance that [the health plan] invite[s] with its directive in the
Certificate for participants to call with questions regarding
coverage. The surgery could not be undone, the cost un-incurred.
[The participant can] not seek insurance retroactively or negotiate
with other providers for services that had already been performed.
[The health plan’s] actions [have] the singular effect of making it
34. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). By now, Kenseth’s
claim has been under review for six years.
35. Id. at 1880.
36. Id. at 1881-82.
37. Kenseth II at ?
38. Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2013)
39. McCravy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2012).
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impossible to put [the participant] back in the literal position she
would have been in if the breach had not occurred, and also
rendered very difficult the proof of viable alternatives. 40

In cases that have come this far, the health decisions in
question are serious. The court’s decision in Killian v. Concert
Health Plan five months after Kenseth II was issued illustrates the
point. 41 On April 7, 2006, Mrs. Killian’s doctors told her she would
be dead in five days unless they immediately removed a large
brain tumor. Mr. Killian called the provider participation number
on the front of the insurance card to notify Concert Health Plan
about the surgery. The representative could not find any
information in Concert’s system regarding the hospital where the
procedure was scheduled. She told Mr. Killian to “go ahead with
whatever needed to be done.”
Mr. Killian called the Concert customer service line a second
time the same day to confirm the details of the procedure
including the name of the hospital. The representative said,
“Okay.” She did not inform Mr. Killian that the hospital was out of
network or that there would be limits to his coverage. 42
When the claim was denied, Mr. Killian filed suit under
section 1132(a)(3) requesting equitable relief for breach of
fiduciary duty. The court en banc reversed the panel’s decision to
dismiss the claim. Relying on its Kenseth precedent, the court
found that Concert Health was a statutory trustee under section
1104(a)(1)(b) with duties analogous to a trustee’s common law
duties of loyalty and care. 43
As the Killians had never received a summary plan description
that included a current list of the provider network, the plan
documents were not clear and complete. The Killians had to rely on
the oral representations provided by the plan’s customer service
department to fill in the gaps. Concert then became responsible for
its representatives’ mistakes. Quoting Kenseth, the Killian court
highlights the obligation—this is “especially true when the fiduciary
has not taken appropriate steps to make sure that ministerial
employees will provide the insured with complete and accurate
information that is missing from the plan documents themselves.” 44

B. Equitable Restitution—Unringing the Bell
Post-Amara, equitable restitution for health care claims takes
on a new face in the Affordable Care Act era. The field of health
care economics, once the provenance of a small group of insurance
40. Kenseth II at 885.
41. Killian v. Concert Health Plan, 742 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2013).
42. Mrs. Killian died shortly afterward from complications of her illness.
Id. at 656.
43. Killian I at 34.
44. Id. at 51–52 (quoting Kenseth I at 472 (emphasis in original).
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specialists and Medicare analysts, is now under scrutiny as courts
parse the meaning of equitable restitution for section 1132(a)(3)
claims.
As Amara makes clear, a section 1132(a)(3) plaintiff can
recover a fiduciary surcharge if she can show actual harm and
causation. 45 Actual harm may result from detrimental reliance but
may “also come from the loss of a right protected by ERISA or its
trust-law antecedents.” 46 This would include compensation for the
loss resulting from the trustee’s breach as well as compensation to
prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment. 47
Unlike a pension plan reformation; however, a health care
plan’s fiduciary breach makes it impossible to return the parties to
the positions they held before the breach and difficult to conceive
of equivalent alternatives. The parties have most often made an
irreversible choice in reliance on their understanding of their
health care benefit.

C. Surcharge—A History
The surcharge remedy case law for health plan fiduciary
breaches is not without its detractors. Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson 48
sought to maintain the boundaries between legal and equitable
remedies under section 1132(a)(3). 49 Great-West was attempting to
subrogate itself as beneficiary under a court-approved settlement
for tort damages resulting from an auto accident. 50 The Court
upheld the district court’s dismissal of Great-West’s claims. 51
Justice Scalia begins by reiterating the adage that describes
ERISA as a “comprehensive and reticulated statute.” 52 He expands
on this theme by limiting section 1132(a)(3) to express remedies. 53
Congress set out the remedies it intended to include in the
statute. 54 Gaps in interpretation can be filled by reference to
“standard current works.” 55 Even a remedy like restitution can be
45. Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1881-82.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1880-82 (describing the practice of courts of equity in granting
monetary relief to compensate for losses “from a trustee’s breach of duty, or to
prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment” and including that among a
plaintiff’s allowable recovery upon a showing of actual harm).
48. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 209.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 217 (responding to the dissenting opinions of Ginsburg, J. and
Stevens, J. by explaining that “the law-equity dichotomy” is not an outdated
concept, those are the terms used in the statute, and questions regarding law
and equity can easily be answered by consulting current legal texts).
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legal or equitable. 56 Whether a particular request for restitution is
authorized by section 1132(a)(3) “remains dependent on the nature
of the relief sought.” 57 Equitable relief under section 1132(a)(3) is
limited exclusively to relief that is not legal. 58
With a reference to Judge Posner’s opinion in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 59 Justice Scalia writes that lawsuits for
money damages are legal in nature and may not be brought under
section 1132(a)(3). 60 “[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action
generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or
property in the defendant’s possession.” 61
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent takes issue with the premise that
what is not expressly stated in the statute is excluded under
ERISA. 62 She argues for a model that allows recovery through any
means typical to equity. 63 From her perspective, Great-West was
not suing to recover its loss. Great-West was suing as a subrogee
to recoup the Knudson’s unjust gain. 64 If Congress can designate
backpay as an equitable remedy under Title VII, why, the dissent
wonders, would a similar make-whole compensatory award not be
available under section 1132(a)(3)? 65 For Justice Scalia and
Justice Ginsburg, “comprehensive and reticulated”66 is either a
limitation of or an invitation to interpretive breadth.
In 2004, Justice Ginsburg again called for greater ERISA
clarity. In her concurring opinion in Aetna Health Insurance v.
Davila, 67 she states:
The Court today holds that the claims respondents asserted under
Texas law are totally preempted by § 502(a) of the Employee
Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a).
That decision is consistent with our governing case law on ERISA’s
56. Id. at 212-14 (providing examples from legal articles and texts
illustrating when restitution was considered a legal or equitable remedy).
57. Id. at 215 (referring to Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993),
stating that it did not change the Court’s “well-settled principle” that
restitution is only an equitable remedy or that “whether [restitution] is legal
or equitable in a particular case (and hence whether it is authorized by
§ 502(a)(3)) remains dependent on the nature of the relief sought.”).
58. Id. at 218.
59. Id. at 210 (“A claim for money due and owing under a contract is
‘quintessentially an action at law’”) (quoting Walmart-Mart Stores v. Wells,
213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 214.
62. Id. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress did not
make a choice to limit available relief by relying on the word “equitable,”
which is a concept “unrelated to the substance of the relief sought” and
“obstruct[s] the general goals of ERISA.”).
63. Id. at 228.
64. Id. at 229.
65. Id. at 230.
66. Id. at 209.
67. 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004).
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preemptive scope. I therefore join the Court’s opinion. But, with
greater enthusiasm, as indicated by my dissent in Great-West Life
& Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), I also join “the
rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit
what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.” 68

The opinion points out that, when interpreted to contain such
narrow remedial limits, ERISA’s “preemptive force” effectively
eliminates most forms of relief for lost benefits. 69 “Because the
Court has coupled an encompassing interpretation of ERISA's
preemptive force with a cramped construction of the ‘equitable
relief’ allowable under § 502(a)(3), a ‘regulatory vacuum’ exists:
‘[V]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few
federal substitutes are provided.’” 70
As amicus curiae, the Government suggested that section
68. DeFelice v. AETNA U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J. concurring).
69. Id. at 222.
70. Id. at 456-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, Justice
Ginsburg observes:
A series of the Court's decisions has yielded a host of situations in which
persons adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain
make-whole relief. First, in Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 87 L. Ed. 2d 96, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985), the Court stated,
in dicta: "[T]here is a stark absence--in [ERISA] itself and in its
legislative history--of any reference to an intention to authorize the
recovery of extracontractual damages" for consequential injuries. Id. at
148, 87 L. Ed. 2d 96, 105 S. Ct. 3085. Then, in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 124 L. Ed. 2d 161, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993), the
Court held that § 502(a)(3)’s term "'equitable relief' . . . refer[s] to those
categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as
injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages)." Id. at 256, 124 L. Ed. 2d 161, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (emphasis in
original). Most recently, in Great-West, the Court ruled that, as “§
502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for equitable relief," the provision
excludes "the imposition of personal liability . . . for a contractual
obligation to pay money.” 534 U.S. at 221, 151 L. Ed. 2d 635, 122 S. Ct.
708 (emphasis in original).
As the array of lower court cases and opinions documents, see, e.g.,
Difelice; Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (CA2 2003), cert. prending sub nom,
Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, No. 03-69, fresh consideration of the
availability of consequential damages under § 502(a)(3) is plainly in
order. See 321 F.3d at 106, 107 (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part)
("gaping wound" caused by the breadth of preemption and limited
remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this Court, will not be healed
until the Court "start[s] over" or Congress "wipe[s] the slate clean");
DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 467 (“The vital thing . . . is that either Congress or
the Court act quickly, because the current situation is plainly
untenable."); Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The
Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West,
103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 1365 (2003) (hereinafter Langbein) (“The
Supreme Court needs to . . . realign ERISA remedy law with the trust
remedial tradition that Congress intended [when it provided in
§ 502(a)(3) for] ‘appropriate equitable relief.’”).
Davila at 222-24.
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1132(a)(3) would offer “some forms of make-whole remedies in
equity “against a breaching fiduciary.” 71 Justice Ginsburg
encourages future plaintiffs to evaluate this approach. She writes,
“[a]s the array of lower court cases and opinions documents, for
example DiFelice; Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2nd Cir. 2003) (cert.
pending sub nom) and Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, fresh
consideration of the availability of consequential damages under §
502(a)(3) is in order.” 72

D. Unjust Enrichment
Justice Ginsburg’s prescience is apparent in the Seventh
Circuit’s Kenseth II decision. The Kenseth II opinion responds to
Amara by holding that the plaintiff may bring a claim for make
whole damages against Dean, the fiduciary, even though “the
plan’s language unambiguously supports the fiduciary’s decision to
deny coverage.” 73 The court can ignore the plan’s reservation of
rights because it is reforming the plan document in equity to
provide the compensatory relief now authorized, post-Amara, by
the statute. 74
Following a line of reasoning developed by the Fifth Circuit in
Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 75 and by the Fourth Circuit in
McCravy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 76 the Kenseth II court points
out that make-whole damages are not limited to a return of
premium or other strictly compensatory relief. 77 Judge Rovner
observes that Dean “lulled Kenseth into believing that Dean would
cover the cost of the procedure” by encouraging participants to call
for coverage information, by telling her the procedure would be
covered and by failing to inform her that she could not rely on that
advice. 78 As the plan beneficiary, Kenseth could seek to surcharge
Dean under section 1132(a)(3) to prevent unjust enrichment. 79
What does unjust enrichment look like in this new health
plan context? Dean argued that Kenseth must produce evidence of
a specific effective alternative not taken as the measure of
damages. 80 The court rejects this argument. 81 Instead, the court
points to Kenseth’s lost opportunity to negotiate a lower price for
her procedure with Dean or with another provider. 82 In a footnote,
71. Id. at 223.
72. Id. at 222.
73. Kenseth II at 883.
74. Id.
75. 709 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2013).
76. 690 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2012).
77. Kenseth II at 883.
78. Id. at 882.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 884.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 884-85.
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the court points to the district court’s observation that, as with
many healthcare systems across the country, Dean Health
Systems (the hospital and medical providers) and Dean Health
Plan (the insurer) share the same ownership. 83
If Dean Health Plan had approved the claim, Dean Health
Systems would have collected the cost of the procedure,
approximately $35,000, from Dean Health Plan because Dean
Health Plan would have the advantage of a lower negotiated rate
with the health system. 84 Kenseth, without insurance, was billed
$77,000 for the procedure. 85 Her payment of the total billed
amount, plus the full cost of her premium, would have unjustly
enriched Dean Health Systems by more than 100 percent.
Further, and as is also common in the health care industry,
the hospital where Kenseth had the surgery was owned by SSM
Healthcare which owned five percent of Dean Health Systems and
forty-seven percent of Dean Health Plan. 86 This ownership chain
provided a cost recovery at the tail end of the transaction. 87
The potential for a conflict of interest in the fiduciary’s chain
of relationships and connections is well-established in ERISA case
law. 88 Clearly, under the Firestone and Metro Life line of cases, a
court could consider a health plan fiduciary’s conflict of interest as
a factor when weighing a section 1132(a)(3) fiduciary breach claim.

E. Other Theories—Plan as Contract
Judge Posner concurs with the outcome of the Killian decision
but argues with its premise. 89 Just as an employer who is a plan
administrator wears two hats, an insurer can also breach the plan
as contract without a breach of trust. 90 Perhaps attempting to
close Pandora’s box, Judge Posner states that participant suits to
recover benefits like Mr. Killian’s should be brought under
ERISA’s section 1132(a)(1)(B) and analyzed under federal contract
law where the participant can recover contract damages. 91 Mr.
Killian, for example, could sue for the cost difference between the
83. Id. at 882 n.4.
84. Id. at 884-85.
85. Id. at 885.
86. Id. at 871 nn. 1-2.
87. See Rochow v. Life Insurance Company of North America, 737 F.3d 415
(2013) (Exemplifying how the Sixth Circuit has gone so far as to order
disgorgement of profits from a disability insurer who denied the plaintiff’s
claim for benefits after the plaintiff’s expert found that the insurer earned a
windfall of approximately $2.8 million by retaining the plaintiff’s disability
benefits, using an annual return of between 11 percent and 39 percent).
88. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
89. Killian at 55 (Posner, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 57-59.
91. Id. at 60-62.
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out of network fees he was charged and the in network fees he
should have paid once Concert Health’s representative “okayed”
Mrs. Killian’s surgery. 92
As he redirects the analysis of health insurance losses to
contract law, Judge Posner asks two important questions: “How
expansive is the fiduciary obligation to inform a plan participant of
the differences in the plan’s reimbursement for charges by
alternative providers of medical treatment? What body of law
supplies an answer to that question?” 93 The Kenseth decisions
certainly do. Both the district and the appellate court intrepidly
open the medical cost closet door. Both sets of decisions
acknowledge the need for medical cost transparency, if for no other
reason than to prevent a fiduciary from profiting when individuals
have suffered serious economic consequences from the plan
administrator’s misapprehension of their health insurance
coverage.
Looking back, again, to section 1132(a)(3) precedent, the
seeds for equitable relief were planted early on. In a 1999 case,
with that early common fact pattern, brought by an insurer
wishing to subrogate itself as the recipient of the medical damages
paid to a tort plaintiff, Judge Posner sanctioned the creation of a
constructive trust on the insured’s proceeds.
[W]hile the Ninth Circuit appears to believe that the imposition of a
constructive trust in an ERISA case is permissible only when there
has been a breach of trust, FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d
1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997), it has given no reason for this belief and
there is no basis for it either in ERISA or in the principles of equity.
Granted that in times of yore the constructive trust was available
only as a remedy against trustees and other fiduciaries, 1 Dobbs,
supra, § 4.3(2), p. 597, there is nothing to suggest that ERISA’s
drafters wanted to embed their work in a time warp. In ordinary
trust law the historical limitation of the remedy has been
abandoned. Id. § 4.3(2), pp. 597-98, Austin Wakeman Scott &
William Franklin Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 462 (4th Ed. 1989). We
do not think the motto of our law should be “let the dead bury the
living.” Alternative characterizations of Health Cost’s claim
(alternative to both restitution and constructive trust)—as seeking
to impose an equitable lien on the escrow account or seeking a
mandatory injunction directing Washington to sign over her claim to
the money—are also permissible, moreover, and they reinforce our
conclusion that Health Cost’s claim is securely equitable and so
within the jurisdiction conferred on the District Court by ERISA. 94

As participant-beneficiaries turn to the courts to enforce their
rights under the Affordable Care Act, this expansionist view of
92. Id. at 62-66.
93. Id. at 62 (describing the Medicaid program).
94. Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir.
1999).
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ERISA’s equitable remedies will surely shape the debate. 95

IV. CONCLUSION
We have just concluded an historic national debate on the
affordable health care mandate. The Affordable Care Act creates
the means by which health care will be delivered and paid for for
anyone who is not already a government health plan participant.
The details of this social program are being sorted out in real time
through regulation and administrative guidance. The resulting
rights and benefits will be judicially elucidated in the near future.
Federal courts seem to agree that health plans, plan
administrators, insurers, third party agents and even health
systems must now step up to join pension, retirement, life
insurance and other benefits trustees in protecting their
beneficiaries. The remedies for failure to satisfy ERISA’s high
standards will be imposed in equity. 96

95. The Kenseth court’s holding that the duty of loyalty includes an
obligation to provide clear and accurate plan documents similarly expands on
Judge Posner’s impatience with the myriad documents Health Cost Controls
aggregated to communicate its plan terms, none of which could be identified as
the plan document. “This kind of confusion is all too common in ERISA land;
often the terms of an ERISA plan must be inferred from a series of documents
none clearly labeled as ‘the plan.’” Id. at 712.
96. The Act also contained a requirement that certain employers provide
minimum coverage for their employees. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H.

